All Pain, Whose Gain? The Surprising Implications of a New Legal Theory for Redistricting
You'd think the Independent State Legislature Theory helps Republicans. But...
Lots of pixels have been spilled on a legal theory once considered fringe, the Independent State Legislature doctrine. This theory threatens to wreak havoc with centuries of election law. Two upcoming Supreme Court redistricting cases cite this doctrine. Both are brought by Republican-controlled legislatures, so you’d think it would be of net benefit to their party. I did the math. Like the web ads say, the answer might surprise you.
Until recently, the theory was considered radical. It is based on Article I and II of the Constitution, which assign state-level power to regulate federal elections to legislatures. In two cases, Moore v. Harper and Costello v. Carter, lawyers representing Republican legislators question how much of a role the word “legislature” leaves for state courts.
A favorable ruling would go against precedents going back to George Washington’s first term of office. Ironically, the North Carolina General Assembly itself, represented in Moore v. Harper, passed a law two decades ago explicitly handing authority over redistricting to the state Supreme Court they now oppose. But recent Supreme Court rulings – on abortion, on religious expression, and on election law – make clear that the Court is unafraid to break from the past when there’s power or policy at stake.
If the Supreme Court does rule in favor of the theory, voters across the nation will take a major hit in the form of fewer competitive seats. Legislators generally draw safer districts than courts or independent commissions. I have analyzed ten states whose redistricting will potentially be affected by the ISL doctrine. In these states, up to 25 competitive Congressional districts would be replaced by single party-drawn plans. That’s over half of the competitive districts drawn this year! (Contrary to what is being said out there, there’s actually a fair lot of competition in the new maps. That’s a topic for a different day.)
The Independent State Legislature theory would disrupt the partisan balance that has emerged in many states. To determine this, I estimated what a party-blind redistricting process would produce in the ten states* that would be currently affected by the theory. The Princeton Gerrymandering Project has performed computer simulations** and used fairness metrics to identify neutral ranges of outcomes. Only two states, both under single-party control, have outcomes outside the range, Florida (R) and Maryland (D). Left unchecked, single-party control would let the other eight states join them.
However, Congressional power is determined not by single states, but by their combined total representation. So let’s add it all up.
In Moore, overturning court oversight in North Carolina might net three Congressional seats for Republicans. But these seats would potentially be offset by two other states: New York and Maryland. In New York, a court-appointed special master redrew a Congressional map drawn by Democrats that is expected to elect between one and three more Republicans than the legislature’s map. In Maryland, a Democratic seat was made competitive. Applying a win in Moore to all three states would lead to nearly no change in power. Net change: zero, plus or minus one.
A more radical solution is proposed by Pennsylvania legislators in Costello, who suggest that in case of an impasse between the legislature and governor, state courts should be constrained by a federal law that gives a fallback plan. Representatives would be elected under the old lines, or if the number of representatives changes due to reapportionment, by statewide at-large election. In 2020, Pennsylvania was won by Joe Biden, and lost a seat with the new Census. At-large elections would likely have given Democrats an additional nine seats. Whichever way Pennsylvania votes in 2024, the stakes would be increased enormously. Net change: up to nine seats, but which way?
Although it’s not mentioned in the cases before the Supreme Court, there are additional interpretations of the Independent State Legislature theory. Which party do these interpretations help?
First, the theory might eliminate citizen redistricting commissions. Currently, citizens can bring initiatives to the ballot in about 25 states. The establishment of independent redistricting commissions by this route has been a success story for reform. Voters have used this mechanism in Arizona, California, and Michigan. For reformers of both parties and no party, it would be a bitter pill if power reverted to the legislature. In Arizona, the enacted map gets an A grade from the Princeton Gerrymandering Project, with two Democratic seats, four Republican seats, and three competitive seats. An all-Republican legislative process might turn those three competitive seats red. But in California, with its 52 total Congressional districts, the Democratic legislature and governor would be able to draw a map that elects four or five additional Democrats. So overturning independent commissions in these two states might net Democrats an additional one or two seats. (It is worth noting that in Michigan, benefits would go to whichever party wins this fall’s legislative and governor’s elections. This is one case in which Republicans stand to gain, since Democrats seem unlikely to overturn the work of an independent commission.)
In perhaps the most aggressive interpretation of the independent state legislature theory, the Court could say that a governor cannot veto a legislature’s actions. This year, two Congressional redistricting battles involved Republican governors fighting their own party. In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis wanted (and got) a map that elected up to four more Republicans than the legislature’s plan. In New Hampshire, Governor Chris Sununu got a map that made a safe Republican seat more competitive for Democrats. In Wisconsin, Democratic governor Tony Evers didn’t get his way – but the old map, which was Republican-drawn in 2011, was used. In these three states, the net effect of eliminating the governor would be a net gain of up to three more Congressional seats for Democrats.
In summary, almost any interpretation of the Independent State Legislature theory would have effects on Congressional redistricting over the next few years that are close to neutral on average, but often favor Democrats. Such an outcome may give conservatives on the Supreme Court pause.
How is it that such a theory could help Democrats and hurt Republicans? The answer lies in the last decade. In past decades, much reform energy has come from a variety of states, including swing states, where partisan gerrymandering pays off the most. Republicans have taken a more aggressive approach to redistricting, and in many places they have already maxed out their gains.
But neither party should want this change, which replaces a longstanding system of court intervention with a Wild West scenario. This Supreme Court case has profound long-term consequences that go well beyond Congressional districting.
State-level action is the one major route left for reformers to check the runaway power of legislatures, which themselves are often gerrymandered. More broadly, as my colleagues and I have written, every state constitution has provisions that can be used to protect voting rights. Ballot measures like ranked-choice voting can increase competition and de-emphasize extreme candidates. And the theory has potential implications for the selection of Presidential electors. If the Supreme Court blocks these uses of federalism, recovering and strengthening our troubled national democracy will become much harder.
*Arizona, California, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
**The Gerrymandering Project didn’t do simulations in California. With so many districts, the compute time was too long to meet the Project’s goal of doing 1 million simulations in each state. Instead one can use statewide metrics (though these are imperfect by themselves) and example hypothetical maps that show extremes.
Sam’s Newsletter is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Congrats on the newsletter!
I would like to see you take a few steps back, Sam, and put out an initial entry (to be updated from time-to-time) that discusses some set of core values that you would like to see represented in a "good" democracy. I would particularly like to see commentary on how the system set up by the founders might conflict with those values.
For example, should every decision for the U.S. be made at the federal level and reflect what 50+delta percent of the voters would want? If Texas wants to be gun permissive and abortion banning, and California wants to be gun banning and abortion permissive - should the state with more people get to inflict its will on the other? But, more generally, what framework should we look to when answering that question?
Often I see you write a great detailed piece of "if we-do-x then we-get-y" followed by an unclear leap about why y is good or bad and thus supporting or opposing x ... but leaving me a little bit confused about the value judgement on y.
Thanks for the taking a closer look at the partisan implications of Moore v Harper (NC apologizes, again....), but could you address the impact on election procedures more generally? As I understand it, the independent state legislature takes courts out of federal (biennial) elections entirely. There are lots of ways for legislatures to put their thumbs on the election scales other than gerrymandering (voting schedules, absentee rules, all that "targeting Black voters with surgical precision" stuff). This case could pretty much let them run wild on all those important "time and manner" details without worrying that state courts would put a check on their election-rigging.