There are 3 states with extreme gerrymandering in the 2021 cycle that were not subject to court intervention: FL, IL, and TX. This article suggests there is only one.
OK, got it. I read the bar graph too fast and thought it meant there was only 1 gerrymandered state left after the courts weighed it. Still not sure how things will turn out here in Ohio for 2024, with the mapmakers refusing to comply with deadlines set by the state judiciary.
Isn't the biggest danger of the independent state legislature doctrine (in its most radical form) the fact that it would allow state legislators not just to redistrict with no gubernatorial input, but also to ignore the popular presidential vote and assign electors to a given candidate?
In theory they already have the power to do this through ordinary legislation, but purple-state governors of either party would be under incredible pressure to veto it if they tried.
But if Republican legislators in Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin were told they had absolute power to choose the 2024 slate of electors, I think they might use it.
It's not just the fact of having a commission -- Arizona, Virginia, and others have clearly illustrated that the parameters for commissions are critically important as well. The success of the 2020 California Citizens Redistricting Commission was due in large measure to our broadly shared understanding of and deeply shared commitment to the parameters established in Article XXI of the state constitution.
For those not familiar with those parameters, they are:
Article XXI, Sec. 2, (d) The commission shall establish single-member districts for the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and State Board of Equalization pursuant to a mapping process using the following criteria as set forth in the following order of priority:
(1) Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution. Congressional districts shall achieve population equality as nearly as is practicable, and Senatorial, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization districts shall have reasonably equal population with other districts for the same office, except where deviation is required to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or allowable by law.
(2) Districts shall comply with the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1971 and following).
(3) Districts shall be geographically contiguous.
(4) The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions. A community of interest is a contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation. Examples of such shared interests are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process. Communities of interest shall not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.
(5) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographical compactness such that nearby areas of population are not bypassed for more distant population.
(6) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, each Senate district shall be comprised of two whole, complete, and adjacent Assembly districts, and each Board of Equalization district shall be comprised of 10 whole, complete, and adjacent Senate districts.
(e) The place of residence of any incumbent or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.
The order of those ranked priorities was also an important factor. While many people may hope for regular shapes covering the smallest possible areas when looking at maps, the fact that compactness was factor #5 while communities of interest were part (along with and equal to existing city and county boundaries) of factor #4 meant that we were able to focus on listening to how communities defined themselves.
And while "Bad news is more interesting than good news, so we don’t hear too much about successes like Michigan.", it also seems that new news is more interesting than old news -- the "new kids on the block " (our colleagues in Michigan) received a lot more coverage (albeit not all positive) than we did, despite our UNANIMOUS approval (5 Ds, 5 Rs, 4 Others) of our maps and no challenges to our maps in the state's Supreme Court or via referendum (as allowed under the state's constitution).
There are 3 states with extreme gerrymandering in the 2021 cycle that were not subject to court intervention: FL, IL, and TX. This article suggests there is only one.
That is displayed in the bar graph, and those states are listed explicitly in the text underneath it.
OK, got it. I read the bar graph too fast and thought it meant there was only 1 gerrymandered state left after the courts weighed it. Still not sure how things will turn out here in Ohio for 2024, with the mapmakers refusing to comply with deadlines set by the state judiciary.
Isn't the biggest danger of the independent state legislature doctrine (in its most radical form) the fact that it would allow state legislators not just to redistrict with no gubernatorial input, but also to ignore the popular presidential vote and assign electors to a given candidate?
In theory they already have the power to do this through ordinary legislation, but purple-state governors of either party would be under incredible pressure to veto it if they tried.
But if Republican legislators in Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin were told they had absolute power to choose the 2024 slate of electors, I think they might use it.
It's not just the fact of having a commission -- Arizona, Virginia, and others have clearly illustrated that the parameters for commissions are critically important as well. The success of the 2020 California Citizens Redistricting Commission was due in large measure to our broadly shared understanding of and deeply shared commitment to the parameters established in Article XXI of the state constitution.
For those not familiar with those parameters, they are:
Article XXI, Sec. 2, (d) The commission shall establish single-member districts for the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and State Board of Equalization pursuant to a mapping process using the following criteria as set forth in the following order of priority:
(1) Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution. Congressional districts shall achieve population equality as nearly as is practicable, and Senatorial, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization districts shall have reasonably equal population with other districts for the same office, except where deviation is required to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or allowable by law.
(2) Districts shall comply with the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1971 and following).
(3) Districts shall be geographically contiguous.
(4) The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions. A community of interest is a contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation. Examples of such shared interests are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process. Communities of interest shall not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.
(5) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographical compactness such that nearby areas of population are not bypassed for more distant population.
(6) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, each Senate district shall be comprised of two whole, complete, and adjacent Assembly districts, and each Board of Equalization district shall be comprised of 10 whole, complete, and adjacent Senate districts.
(e) The place of residence of any incumbent or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.
The order of those ranked priorities was also an important factor. While many people may hope for regular shapes covering the smallest possible areas when looking at maps, the fact that compactness was factor #5 while communities of interest were part (along with and equal to existing city and county boundaries) of factor #4 meant that we were able to focus on listening to how communities defined themselves.
And while "Bad news is more interesting than good news, so we don’t hear too much about successes like Michigan.", it also seems that new news is more interesting than old news -- the "new kids on the block " (our colleagues in Michigan) received a lot more coverage (albeit not all positive) than we did, despite our UNANIMOUS approval (5 Ds, 5 Rs, 4 Others) of our maps and no challenges to our maps in the state's Supreme Court or via referendum (as allowed under the state's constitution).
J. Ray Kennedy, PhD
Commissioner
California Citizens Redistricting Commission